Let’s further consider the logical possibilities of Venus Protocol being attacked: 1) Security experts say that some big investors were phished. Conventional wisdom suggests that they could just withdraw funds directly with the private key. How could there be a flash loan? Most likely, the hacker obtained updateDelegate authorization through social engineering, gaining access to the account of a large investor, but without immediate liquidity to withdraw. In layman's terms, the hacker obtained the authority, but the large investor only had collateral, not the borrowed funds. The hacker had to find a way to obtain the collateral of the large investor. 2) Is it that the individual phishing incidents involving the major investor have nothing to do with the Venus contract? As mentioned earlier, if the hacker discovered that the major investor's account had no liquidity, their efforts would normally be in vain. But why was it possible to withdraw collateral through a simple flash loan attack? The answer lies in the Venus contract mechanism. The hacker may have used flash loans and a series of vToken cross-platform exchange rate differences to help the major investor repay the collateral and even withdraw some extra. Simply put, it is true that the collateral of the big investors was stolen, but it is very likely that it will become a bad debt of the Venus contract platform, unless the big investors are stupid enough to pay back the platform. 3) While other users' funds are temporarily safe, the Venus platform faces significant liability concerns. While the attack was triggered by a large investor being phished by a social engineering scheme, the platform ultimately profited. The $30 million stolen is likely to become bad debt for the Venus platform, and coupled with the temporary panic and bank run, the impact could be devastating for Venus. But the greater impact is that this incident has brought back horrific memories of Venus's habitual attacks. The XVS price manipulation incident and its use as a tool for money laundering via BNB's cross-chain bridge are all examples of damage caused by fundamental flaws in Venus's security engineering. As the largest lending protocol on BSC, this is unacceptable. Note: The above is based on reasonable speculation based on the currently disclosed information. The details will be determined based on actual disclosed details.Let’s further consider the logical possibilities of Venus Protocol being attacked: 1) Security experts say that some big investors were phished. Conventional wisdom suggests that they could just withdraw funds directly with the private key. How could there be a flash loan? Most likely, the hacker obtained updateDelegate authorization through social engineering, gaining access to the account of a large investor, but without immediate liquidity to withdraw. In layman's terms, the hacker obtained the authority, but the large investor only had collateral, not the borrowed funds. The hacker had to find a way to obtain the collateral of the large investor. 2) Is it that the individual phishing incidents involving the major investor have nothing to do with the Venus contract? As mentioned earlier, if the hacker discovered that the major investor's account had no liquidity, their efforts would normally be in vain. But why was it possible to withdraw collateral through a simple flash loan attack? The answer lies in the Venus contract mechanism. The hacker may have used flash loans and a series of vToken cross-platform exchange rate differences to help the major investor repay the collateral and even withdraw some extra. Simply put, it is true that the collateral of the big investors was stolen, but it is very likely that it will become a bad debt of the Venus contract platform, unless the big investors are stupid enough to pay back the platform. 3) While other users' funds are temporarily safe, the Venus platform faces significant liability concerns. While the attack was triggered by a large investor being phished by a social engineering scheme, the platform ultimately profited. The $30 million stolen is likely to become bad debt for the Venus platform, and coupled with the temporary panic and bank run, the impact could be devastating for Venus. But the greater impact is that this incident has brought back horrific memories of Venus's habitual attacks. The XVS price manipulation incident and its use as a tool for money laundering via BNB's cross-chain bridge are all examples of damage caused by fundamental flaws in Venus's security engineering. As the largest lending protocol on BSC, this is unacceptable. Note: The above is based on reasonable speculation based on the currently disclosed information. The details will be determined based on actual disclosed details.

Why is it always stolen? On the systemic flaws in Venus contract design

2025/09/03 13:00

Let’s further consider the logical possibilities of Venus Protocol being attacked:

1) Security experts say that some big investors were phished. Conventional wisdom suggests that they could just withdraw funds directly with the private key. How could there be a flash loan?

Most likely, the hacker obtained updateDelegate authorization through social engineering, gaining access to the account of a large investor, but without immediate liquidity to withdraw. In layman's terms, the hacker obtained the authority, but the large investor only had collateral, not the borrowed funds. The hacker had to find a way to obtain the collateral of the large investor.

2) Is it that the individual phishing incidents involving the major investor have nothing to do with the Venus contract? As mentioned earlier, if the hacker discovered that the major investor's account had no liquidity, their efforts would normally be in vain. But why was it possible to withdraw collateral through a simple flash loan attack? The answer lies in the Venus contract mechanism. The hacker may have used flash loans and a series of vToken cross-platform exchange rate differences to help the major investor repay the collateral and even withdraw some extra.

Simply put, it is true that the collateral of the big investors was stolen, but it is very likely that it will become a bad debt of the Venus contract platform, unless the big investors are stupid enough to pay back the platform.

3) While other users' funds are temporarily safe, the Venus platform faces significant liability concerns. While the attack was triggered by a large investor being phished by a social engineering scheme, the platform ultimately profited. The $30 million stolen is likely to become bad debt for the Venus platform, and coupled with the temporary panic and bank run, the impact could be devastating for Venus.

But the greater impact is that this incident has brought back horrific memories of Venus's habitual attacks. The XVS price manipulation incident and its use as a tool for money laundering via BNB's cross-chain bridge are all examples of damage caused by fundamental flaws in Venus's security engineering. As the largest lending protocol on BSC, this is unacceptable. Note: The above is based on reasonable speculation based on the currently disclosed information. The details will be determined based on actual disclosed details.

Piyasa Fırsatı
Binance Coin Logosu
Binance Coin Fiyatı(BNB)
$844.07
$844.07$844.07
-1.74%
USD
Binance Coin (BNB) Canlı Fiyat Grafiği
Sorumluluk Reddi: Bu sitede yeniden yayınlanan makaleler, halka açık platformlardan alınmıştır ve yalnızca bilgilendirme amaçlıdır. MEXC'nin görüşlerini yansıtmayabilir. Tüm hakları telif sahiplerine aittir. Herhangi bir içeriğin üçüncü taraf haklarını ihlal ettiğini düşünüyorsanız, kaldırılması için lütfen service@support.mexc.com ile iletişime geçin. MEXC, içeriğin doğruluğu, eksiksizliği veya güncelliği konusunda hiçbir garanti vermez ve sağlanan bilgilere dayalı olarak alınan herhangi bir eylemden sorumlu değildir. İçerik, finansal, yasal veya diğer profesyonel tavsiye niteliğinde değildir ve MEXC tarafından bir tavsiye veya onay olarak değerlendirilmemelidir.

Ayrıca Şunları da Beğenebilirsiniz

XRP gaat multichain: 5 inzichten uit Ripple’s strategie op Solana Breakpoint

XRP gaat multichain: 5 inzichten uit Ripple’s strategie op Solana Breakpoint

Ripple zet een duidelijke stap richting een bredere rol voor XRP binnen het multichain-ecosysteem. Tijdens het Solana Breakpoint-event lichtte Luke Judges, Global
Paylaş
Coinstats2025/12/16 00:17
Market Direction and Use Case Comparison for 2026 –

Market Direction and Use Case Comparison for 2026 –

The post Market Direction and Use Case Comparison for 2026 – appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. Cryptocurrency markets remain mixed as major assets show varying
Paylaş
BitcoinEthereumNews2025/12/16 00:21
How to earn from cloud mining: IeByte’s upgraded auto-cloud mining platform unlocks genuine passive earnings

How to earn from cloud mining: IeByte’s upgraded auto-cloud mining platform unlocks genuine passive earnings

The post How to earn from cloud mining: IeByte’s upgraded auto-cloud mining platform unlocks genuine passive earnings appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. contributor Posted: September 17, 2025 As digital assets continue to reshape global finance, cloud mining has become one of the most effective ways for investors to generate stable passive income. Addressing the growing demand for simplicity, security, and profitability, IeByte has officially upgraded its fully automated cloud mining platform, empowering both beginners and experienced investors to earn Bitcoin, Dogecoin, and other mainstream cryptocurrencies without the need for hardware or technical expertise. Why cloud mining in 2025? Traditional crypto mining requires expensive hardware, high electricity costs, and constant maintenance. In 2025, with blockchain networks becoming more competitive, these barriers have grown even higher. Cloud mining solves this by allowing users to lease professional mining power remotely, eliminating the upfront costs and complexity. IeByte stands at the forefront of this transformation, offering investors a transparent and seamless path to daily earnings. IeByte’s upgraded auto-cloud mining platform With its latest upgrade, IeByte introduces: Full Automation: Mining contracts can be activated in just one click, with all processes handled by IeByte’s servers. Enhanced Security: Bank-grade encryption, cold wallets, and real-time monitoring protect every transaction. Scalable Options: From starter packages to high-level investment contracts, investors can choose the plan that matches their goals. Global Reach: Already trusted by users in over 100 countries. Mining contracts for 2025 IeByte offers a wide range of contracts tailored for every investor level. From entry-level plans with daily returns to premium high-yield packages, the platform ensures maximum accessibility. Contract Type Duration Price Daily Reward Total Earnings (Principal + Profit) Starter Contract 1 Day $200 $6 $200 + $6 + $10 bonus Bronze Basic Contract 2 Days $500 $13.5 $500 + $27 Bronze Basic Contract 3 Days $1,200 $36 $1,200 + $108 Silver Advanced Contract 1 Day $5,000 $175 $5,000 + $175 Silver Advanced Contract 2 Days $8,000 $320 $8,000 + $640 Silver…
Paylaş
BitcoinEthereumNews2025/09/17 23:48