The post Meet The Florida Sugar Barons Worth $4 Billion And Getting Sweet Deals From Donald Trump appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. The Fanjul family has been wooing politicians for decades, but their bet on the Trump administration is their best yet, after the president added tariffs for foreign competitors and pushed Coca-Cola to use its cane sugar to make American soda great again. To celebrate Donald Trump’s second inauguration earlier this year, Coca-Cola CEO James Quincey came to Washington with an appropriate symbol of appreciation: a commemorative edition of the president’s favorite beverage, Diet Coke. But the meeting got a little tense when Trump asked why the company doesn’t use cane sugar in its signature soda—commonly referred to as “Mexican Coke”—and Quincey demurred, saying that “there wasn’t enough supply.” Trump wasn’t buying it, according to the book 2024: How Trump Retook The White House, and soon called up one of his top political donors and friend of more than 40 years, José ‘Pepe’ Fanjul—the 81-year-old Palm Beach sugar magnate who lives near Mar-a-Lago—to ask if the information was true. That conversation appears to have planted the seed for what transpired in the months following the inauguration, which Fanjul attended after donating nearly $1 million. Over the summer, when Quincey returned to Washington, Trump brought up the cane sugar issue again, and then shortly after he announced on social media that Coca-Cola would create an entirely new line: “This will be a very good move by them—You’ll see. It’s just better!” Fanjul and his siblings—who control a sugar and real estate empire, including Domino Sugar and Florida Crystals, that Forbes estimates to be worth some $4 billion—have been jockeying for the Coca-Cola business ever since. Even as the highly anticipated U.S. cane sugar line is expected to begin production soon, as Coca-Cola confirmed it would launch this fall, details of where the Atlanta-based beverage giant will source its U.S-farmed cane sugar remain… The post Meet The Florida Sugar Barons Worth $4 Billion And Getting Sweet Deals From Donald Trump appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. The Fanjul family has been wooing politicians for decades, but their bet on the Trump administration is their best yet, after the president added tariffs for foreign competitors and pushed Coca-Cola to use its cane sugar to make American soda great again. To celebrate Donald Trump’s second inauguration earlier this year, Coca-Cola CEO James Quincey came to Washington with an appropriate symbol of appreciation: a commemorative edition of the president’s favorite beverage, Diet Coke. But the meeting got a little tense when Trump asked why the company doesn’t use cane sugar in its signature soda—commonly referred to as “Mexican Coke”—and Quincey demurred, saying that “there wasn’t enough supply.” Trump wasn’t buying it, according to the book 2024: How Trump Retook The White House, and soon called up one of his top political donors and friend of more than 40 years, José ‘Pepe’ Fanjul—the 81-year-old Palm Beach sugar magnate who lives near Mar-a-Lago—to ask if the information was true. That conversation appears to have planted the seed for what transpired in the months following the inauguration, which Fanjul attended after donating nearly $1 million. Over the summer, when Quincey returned to Washington, Trump brought up the cane sugar issue again, and then shortly after he announced on social media that Coca-Cola would create an entirely new line: “This will be a very good move by them—You’ll see. It’s just better!” Fanjul and his siblings—who control a sugar and real estate empire, including Domino Sugar and Florida Crystals, that Forbes estimates to be worth some $4 billion—have been jockeying for the Coca-Cola business ever since. Even as the highly anticipated U.S. cane sugar line is expected to begin production soon, as Coca-Cola confirmed it would launch this fall, details of where the Atlanta-based beverage giant will source its U.S-farmed cane sugar remain…

Meet The Florida Sugar Barons Worth $4 Billion And Getting Sweet Deals From Donald Trump

2025/10/17 18:38

The Fanjul family has been wooing politicians for decades, but their bet on the Trump administration is their best yet, after the president added tariffs for foreign competitors and pushed Coca-Cola to use its cane sugar to make American soda great again.


To celebrate Donald Trump’s second inauguration earlier this year, Coca-Cola CEO James Quincey came to Washington with an appropriate symbol of appreciation: a commemorative edition of the president’s favorite beverage, Diet Coke. But the meeting got a little tense when Trump asked why the company doesn’t use cane sugar in its signature soda—commonly referred to as “Mexican Coke”—and Quincey demurred, saying that “there wasn’t enough supply.”

Trump wasn’t buying it, according to the book 2024: How Trump Retook The White House, and soon called up one of his top political donors and friend of more than 40 years, José ‘Pepe’ Fanjul—the 81-year-old Palm Beach sugar magnate who lives near Mar-a-Lago—to ask if the information was true. That conversation appears to have planted the seed for what transpired in the months following the inauguration, which Fanjul attended after donating nearly $1 million. Over the summer, when Quincey returned to Washington, Trump brought up the cane sugar issue again, and then shortly after he announced on social media that Coca-Cola would create an entirely new line: “This will be a very good move by them—You’ll see. It’s just better!”

Fanjul and his siblings—who control a sugar and real estate empire, including Domino Sugar and Florida Crystals, that Forbes estimates to be worth some $4 billion—have been jockeying for the Coca-Cola business ever since. Even as the highly anticipated U.S. cane sugar line is expected to begin production soon, as Coca-Cola confirmed it would launch this fall, details of where the Atlanta-based beverage giant will source its U.S-farmed cane sugar remain scant. Coca-Cola declined to comment. Yet a source familiar with the company’s launch told Forbes that Coca-Cola “is trying to keep this under wraps” but confirmed that the Fanjuls “will be in the mix.”

Although it will probably not be an exclusive contract, the Fanjuls are among the best-positioned to take advantage of Coca-Cola’s American cane sugar expansion.

The Fanjul siblings—vice chairman and president Pepe, 81, and CEO and chairman Alfonso, 88, known as Alfy, as well as Alexander, 75, Andres, 67, and Lillian, 87, who serve as senior vice presidents and directors in the family business—are the owners of the largest cane sugar refiner in the world. The family makes 16% of raw sugar produced in the U.S. through Florida Crystals, which recorded $5.5 billion in revenue in 2024. In addition to their sugar mills, refineries, and real estate, the Fanjuls’ empire also includes the famed Casa de Campo resort in the Dominican Republic.

The Sweet Life: The Fanjul Group owns a stake in Central Romana in the Dominican Republic, the country’s largest private employer and landowner, including the Casa de Campo resort.

Casa de Campo Resort & Villas

The Fanjul family, who emigrated to South Florida from Cuba in 1959, following the Fidel Castro-led revolution in their home country, have long donated to both political parties. They also have plenty of critics. The Cato Institute’s Colin Grabow, who published a 2018 report titled “Candy-Coated Cartel: It’s Time To Kill The U.S. Sugar Program,” says that if the Fanjuls represent the American Dream, that’s “a pretty cynical take on what the American Dream is.”

“It’s not the classic American story of you get in and you develop cozy connections with politicians and you try to bend government policy to your will,” says Grabow. “The American Dream is you succeed based on your inventiveness and your hard work and not because of your ability to manipulate government policy.”

A representative for the Fanjuls responds: “The Fanjul family is grateful for the opportunities that are possible in this country through determination and a strong work ethic. Their story is the American Dream.”

The family has been a supplier to Coke for many years, though never exclusively, and never for any specific product. For Coca-Cola, working exclusively with Florida Crystals—which is the largest certified regenerative organic farm in the U.S. and the only one growing sugar—would present the chance to promote a sustainable and traceable supply chain.

The Fanjuls’ embrace of sustainability is a recent development. The clan is better known for weathering decades of accusations that its farms pollute waterways from chemical runoff (the Fanjuls’ representative says their “farms filter the water and release it cleaner than when it arrived.”) There’s also alleged air pollution from burning sugarcane leaves to prepare plants for harvest, which can release toxic gasses into the air. (They say it’s a “common method” that’s “highly regulated” by the state and that they do not burn within two miles of any residential or commercial structure.)

The firm operates a renewable energy plant powered by sugarcane fiber and one of the country’s 10 largest compost facilities, too. “We are members of those communities. Our employees live in them, and we are committed to protecting and serving them,” says the representative.

Environmental degradation is not the only sin that the Fanjuls have been accused of. There have been allegations of forced labor in the Dominican Republic, which they have denied for years. (The company says it’s “proactive regarding improving the labor conditions.”)

“The [Fanjuls] did not achieve success overnight,” adds the representative. “Over the past 65 years, through hard work, determination, and expertise, they grew their business to where it stands today.”

The Fanjul family began farming and producing sugar in Cuba in the 1850s, eventually becoming one of the largest producers in the country. The siblings’ parents, Alfonso Fanjul Sr. and Lillian Gomez-Mena, married in 1936, uniting two of the island’s wealthiest sugar families. By 1959, their sugar empire had ten mills, real estate across Cuba and a broker in New York. But after the revolution, Castro seized their assets.

“I was sitting in the family office when Fidel Castro’s people came in to discuss what was going to happen. We sat down with lawyers, and I had a yellow pad and pencil, and they put machine guns on the table,” Alfy recalled in a 2013 speech at Fordham University, his alma mater that he graduated from just as the revolution ended in 1959. “We chatted for a while, and then the leader grabbed the machine gun, pointed to the map on the wall where we had the different properties our company owned, looked at me, and said, ‘We’re going to take it all away.’”

After fleeing to New York and pooling $640,000 (more than $7 million in today’s dollars) with other well-off Cuban refugees, the Fanjuls bought 4,000 acres of land in Pahokee, on the shores of Florida’s Lake Okeechobee. They then purchased old parts of smaller sugar mills in Louisiana and shipped them in by barge. Their first American sugar mill opened in 1960.

Alfonso Jr., who was then just 22, went to work for his father in the family business, and eventually Pepe, Andres and Alexander joined as well. The brothers got their first big break in 1984, when they bought the sugar operations of Gulf and Western, a conglomerate that at the time owned Paramount Pictures. To pay for it, the Fanjuls took out $240 million in debt (or about $750 million in current terms). As Pepe later told Vanity Fair, “That put us on the map.”

Ever since, the Fanjuls learned to make themselves well-heard. Take Alfy’s relationship with the Clinton administration, after serving as co-chairman of his Florida campaign in 1992.

On Presidents’ Day in 1996, Bill Clinton was interrupted while breaking up with Monica Lewinsky in the Oval Office when the phone rang. The president took the call from Alfy, who then spent 20 minutes complaining to him about Vice President Al Gore’s proposal to tax Florida sugar growers a penny per pound to fund the cleanup of the polluted Florida Everglades. Whatever Alfy said worked: According to reporting at the time, Clinton quietly withdrew his support.

Says Cato’s Grabow, “The ability to call up the president of the United States and get him on the phone for an extended period of time says something about the kind of pull that these guys enjoy.”

By the late 1990s, the Fanjuls’ sugar business had $275 million in sales and the family owned more acreage than U.S. Sugar, its biggest rival. Alfy and Pepe went on a buying spree, picking up a New York sugar refinery in 1998 and acquiring Domino Sugar for $200 million in 2001. That same year they rolled up those refineries into ASR Group and later added other brands including C&H. By 2007, Florida Crystals’ revenues had grown to $3 billion.

ASR is now the world’s largest cane sugar refiner, and it’s entirely owned by Florida Crystals. For 26 years, the Sugarcane Growers Cooperative of Florida owned a minority stake, but the Fanjuls bought the co-op out in 2024 for an undisclosed amount.

Apart from Florida Crystals, the Fanjuls’ most high-profile business is the Dominican Republic’s agricultural and tourism conglomerate Central Romana. They own 35%, worth about $190 million, according to corporate records in Luxembourg. Central Romana is also the Dominican Republic’s largest sugar producer, which the Biden Administration banned from importing into the U.S. in 2022 amid allegations of forced labor on some of its sugar farms. At the time, the government’s investigation of Central Romana included accusations of 11 different indicators of forced labor, including abuse of vulnerability, isolation, withholding of wages, abusive working and living conditions and excessive overtime.

A representative for Central Romana said that the company has “always disputed” the government’s allegations. They added that the company has invested more than $50 million in free living facilities for its agricultural workers, as well as schools and sanitary infrastructure, and that it pays salaries that are 50% higher than the legal minimum wage in the Dominican Republic.

Restrictions on the company were removed in March—making Central Romana one of the few foreign winners of Trump’s first year in office. According to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection spokesperson, the order was “modified” following “documented improvements to labor standards, verified by independent sources.”

“Central Romana has taken action to address the concerns outlined,” the spokesperson told Forbes. “CBP will continue to closely monitor compliance.”

Pepe remains a prominent figure in Trump’s inner circle. He attended and hosted fundraisers for him during the 2016 and 2020 presidential campaigns, and in May 2024—on the day of Trump’s conviction in New York on 34 counts of falsifying business records—he cohosted a fundraiser for Trump at his luxury co-op on Manhattan’s Upper East Side.

The First Soda: Earlier this year, Donald Trump lobbied Coca-Cola to use American sugarcane, which would be a boon to the Fanjuls, who have long been Trump donors and live near Mar-a-Lago.

Lynne Sladky/AP

In all, the Fanjul family and their companies have given more than $7 million to Trump fundraising committees and super PACs since 2016. Since 1977, they’ve spent at least $24 million on federal and Florida state campaigns and PACs, giving both to Democrats and Republicans, according to data from the Federal Election Commission and Florida’s Department of State. Florida Crystals has also spent more than $20 million lobbying federal politicians since 1999.

Cane sugar prices in America have been boosted by the government for decades through market price supports as well as below-market loans. The price of sugar in the U.S. is roughly twice as much as the global sugar market, per the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. And that government support isn’t ending anytime soon: Those loans were also a part of the Trump Administration’s Big Beautiful Bill, signed into law on July 4, which increases the loan rate for raw cane sugar from 19.75 cents per pound to 24 cents. Trump also slapped a 50% tariff on Brazil, the biggest exporter of raw sugar to the U.S. (The Fanjuls also source sugar from Brazil.)

The help is much-needed. Global sugar prices have been volatile over the past decade, and companies like Florida Crystals and its competitors have struggled due to lower prices and a negative outlook for commodities. That’s why expanding their business with Coca-Cola will be a nice sweetener for the Fanjuls. And if Trump can keep American sugar prices high and competitors out, they’ll keep profiting. When he eventually leaves office, they can always go back to doing what they know best—courting politicians on both sides of the aisle.

More from Forbes

ForbesMeet The Mastermind Behind The $1.9 Billion Poppi DealForbesWhy Coca-Cola’s New Cane Sugar Line Might Not Be As Good As Mexican CokeForbesChicago’s Hot Dog King Dick Portillo On Selling Out And Moving On

Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/chloesorvino/2025/10/16/fanjul-family-sugar-barons-worth-4-billion-donald-trump-coca-cola/

Disclaimer: The articles reposted on this site are sourced from public platforms and are provided for informational purposes only. They do not necessarily reflect the views of MEXC. All rights remain with the original authors. If you believe any content infringes on third-party rights, please contact service@support.mexc.com for removal. MEXC makes no guarantees regarding the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the content and is not responsible for any actions taken based on the information provided. The content does not constitute financial, legal, or other professional advice, nor should it be considered a recommendation or endorsement by MEXC.
Share Insights

You May Also Like

Ethereum unveils roadmap focusing on scaling, interoperability, and security at Japan Dev Conference

Ethereum unveils roadmap focusing on scaling, interoperability, and security at Japan Dev Conference

The post Ethereum unveils roadmap focusing on scaling, interoperability, and security at Japan Dev Conference appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. Key Takeaways Ethereum’s new roadmap was presented by Vitalik Buterin at the Japan Dev Conference. Short-term priorities include Layer 1 scaling and raising gas limits to enhance transaction throughput. Vitalik Buterin presented Ethereum’s development roadmap at the Japan Dev Conference today, outlining the blockchain platform’s priorities across multiple timeframes. The short-term goals focus on scaling solutions and increasing Layer 1 gas limits to improve transaction capacity. Mid-term objectives target enhanced cross-Layer 2 interoperability and faster network responsiveness to create a more seamless user experience across different scaling solutions. The long-term vision emphasizes building a secure, simple, quantum-resistant, and formally verified minimalist Ethereum network. This approach aims to future-proof the platform against emerging technological threats while maintaining its core functionality. The roadmap presentation comes as Ethereum continues to compete with other blockchain platforms for market share in the smart contract and decentralized application space. Source: https://cryptobriefing.com/ethereum-roadmap-scaling-interoperability-security-japan/
Share
BitcoinEthereumNews2025/09/18 00:25
Understanding Bitcoin Mining Through the Lens of Dutch Disease

Understanding Bitcoin Mining Through the Lens of Dutch Disease

There’s a paradox at the heart of modern economics: sometimes, discovering a valuable resource can make a country poorer. It sounds impossible — how can sudden wealth lead to economic decline? Yet this pattern has repeated across decades and continents, from the Netherlands’ natural gas boom in the 1960s to oil discoveries in numerous developing countries. Economists have a name for this phenomenon: Dutch Disease. Today, as Bitcoin Mining operations establish themselves in regions around the world, attracted by cheap resources. With electricity and favorable regulations, economists are asking an intriguing question: Does cryptocurrency mining share enough characteristics with traditional resource booms to trigger similar economic distortions? Or is this digital industry different enough to avoid the pitfalls that have plagued oil-rich and gas-rich nations? The Kazakhstan Case Study In 2021, Kazakhstan became a global Bitcoin mining hub after China’s cryptocurrency ban. Within months, mining operations consumed nearly 8% of the nation’s electricity. The initial windfall — investment, jobs, tax revenue — quickly turned to crisis. By early 2022, the country faced rolling blackouts, surging energy costs for manufacturers, and public protests. The government imposed strict mining limits, but damage to traditional industries was already done. This pattern has a name: Dutch Disease. Understanding Dutch Disease Dutch Disease describes how sudden resource wealth can paradoxically weaken an economy. The term comes from the Netherlands’ experience after discovering North Sea gas in 1959. Despite the windfall, the Dutch economy suffered as the booming gas sector drove up wages and currency values, making traditional manufacturing uncompetitive. The mechanisms were interconnected: Foreign buyers needed Dutch guilders to purchase gas, strengthening the currency and making Dutch exports expensive. The gas sector bid up wages, forcing manufacturers to raise pay while competing in global markets where they couldn’t pass those costs along. The most talented workers and infrastructure investment flowed to gas extraction rather than diverse economic activities. When gas prices eventually fell in the 1980s, the Netherlands found itself with a hollowed-out industrial base — wealthier in raw terms but economically weaker. The textile factories had closed. Manufacturing expertise had evaporated. The younger generation possessed skills in gas extraction but limited training in other industries. This pattern has repeated globally. Nigeria’s oil discovery devastated its agricultural sector. Venezuela’s resource wealth correlates with chronic economic instability. The phenomenon is so familiar that economists call it the “resource curse” — the observation that countries with abundant natural resources often perform worse economically than countries without them. Bitcoin mining creates similar dynamics. Mining operations are essentially warehouses of specialized computers solving mathematical puzzles to earn bitcoin rewards (currently worth over $200,000 per block) — the catch: massive electricity consumption. A single facility can consume as much power as a small city, creating economic pressures comparable to those of traditional resource booms. How Mining Crowds Out Other Industries Dutch Disease operates through four interconnected channels: Resource Competition: Mining operations consume massive amounts of electricity at preferential rates, leaving less capacity for factories, data centers, and residential users. In constrained power grids, this creates a zero-sum competition in which mining’s profitability directly undermines other industries. Textile manufacturers in El Salvador reported a 40% increase in electricity costs within a year of nearby mining operations — costs that made global competitiveness untenable. Price Inflation: Mining operators bidding aggressively for electricity, real estate, technical labor, and infrastructure drive up input costs across regional economies. Small and medium enterprises operating on thin margins are particularly vulnerable to these shocks. Talent Reallocation: High mining wages draw skilled electricians, engineers, and technicians from traditional sectors. Universities report declining enrollment in manufacturing engineering as students pivot toward cryptocurrency specializations — skills that may prove narrow if mining operations relocate or profitability collapses. Infrastructure Lock-In: Grid capacity, cooling systems, and telecommunications networks optimized for mining rather than diversified development make regions increasingly dependent on a single volatile industry. This specialization makes economic diversification progressively more difficult and expensive. Where Vulnerability Is Highest The risk of mining-induced Dutch Disease depends on several structural factors: Small, undiversified economies face the most significant risk. When mining represents 5–10% of GDP or electricity consumption, it can dominate economic outcomes. El Salvador’s embrace of Bitcoin and Central Asian republics with significant mining operations exemplify this concentration risk. Subsidized energy creates perverse incentives. When governments provide electricity at a loss, mining operations enjoy artificial profitability that attracts excessive investment, intensifying Dutch Disease dynamics. The disconnect between private returns and social costs ensures mining expands beyond economically efficient levels. Weak governance limits effective responses. Without robust monitoring, transparent pricing, or enforceable frameworks, governments struggle to course-correct even when distortions become apparent. Rapid, unplanned growth creates an immediate crisis. When operations scale faster than infrastructure can accommodate, the result is blackouts, equipment damage, and cascading economic disruptions. Why Bitcoin Mining Differs from Traditional Resource Curses Several distinctions suggest mining-induced distortions may be more manageable than historical resource curses: Operational Mobility: Unlike oil fields, mining facilities can relocate relatively quickly. When China banned mining in 2021, operators moved to Kazakhstan, the U.S., and elsewhere within months. This mobility creates different dynamics — governments have leverage through regulation and pricing, but also face competition. The threat of exit disciplines both miners and regulators, potentially yielding more efficient outcomes than traditional resource sectors, where geographic necessity reduces flexibility. No Currency Appreciation: Classical Dutch Disease devastated manufacturing due to currency appreciation. Bitcoin mining doesn’t trigger this mechanism — mining revenues are traded globally and typically converted offshore, avoiding the local currency effects that made Dutch products uncompetitive in the 1960s. Export-oriented manufacturing can remain price-competitive if direct resource competition and input costs are managed. Profitability Volatility: Mining economics are extraordinarily sensitive to Bitcoin prices, network difficulty, and energy costs. When Bitcoin fell from $65,000 to under $20,000 in 2022, many operations became unprofitable and shut down rapidly. This boom-bust cycle, while disruptive, prevents the permanent structural transformation characterizing oil-dependent economies. Resources get released back to the broader economy during busts. Repurposable Infrastructure: Mining facilities can be repurposed as regular data centers. Electrical infrastructure serves other industrial uses. Telecommunications upgrades benefit diverse businesses. Unlike exhausted oil fields requiring environmental cleanup, mining infrastructure can support cloud computing, AI research, or other digital economy activities — creating potential for positive spillovers. Managing the Risk: Three Approaches Bitcoin stakeholders and host regions should consider three strategies to capture benefits while mitigating Dutch Disease risks: Dynamic Energy Pricing: Moving from fixed, subsidized rates toward pricing that reflects actual resource scarcity and opportunity costs. Iceland and Nordic countries have implemented time-of-use pricing and interruptible contracts that allow mining during off-peak periods while preserving capacity for critical uses during demand surges. Transparent, rule-based pricing formulas that adjust for baseline generation costs, grid congestion during peak periods, and environmental externalities let mining flourish when economically appropriate while automatically constraining it during resource competition. The challenge is political — subsidized electricity often exists for good reasons, including supporting industrial development and helping low-income residents. But allowing below-cost electricity to attract mining operations that may harm more than help represents a false economy. Different jurisdictions are finding different balances: some embrace market-based pricing, others maintain subsidies while restricting mining access, and some ban mining outright. Concentration Limits: Formal constraints on mining’s share of regional electricity and economic activity can prevent dominance. Norway has experimented with caps limiting mining to specific percentages of regional power capacity. The logic is straightforward: if mining represents 10–15% of electricity use, it’s significant but doesn’t dominate. If it reaches 40–50%, Dutch Disease risks become severe. These caps create certainty for all stakeholders. Miners understand expansion parameters. Other industries know they won’t be entirely squeezed out. Grid operators can plan with more explicit constraints. The challenge lies in determining appropriate thresholds — too low forgoes legitimate opportunity, too high fails to prevent problems. Smaller, less diversified economies warrant more conservative limits than larger, more robust ones. Multi-Purpose Infrastructure: Rather than specializing exclusively in mining, strategic planning should ensure investments serve broader purposes. Grid expansion benefiting diverse industrial users, telecommunications targeting rural connectivity alongside mining needs, and workforce programs emphasizing transferable skills (data center operations, electrical systems management, cybersecurity) can treat mining as a bridge industry, justifying infrastructure that enables broader digital economy development. Singapore’s evolution from an oil-refining hub to a diversified financial and technology center provides a valuable template: leverage the initial high-value industry to build capabilities that support economic complexity, rather than becoming path-dependent on a single volatile sector. Some regions are applying this thinking to Bitcoin mining — asking what infrastructure serves mining today but could enable cloud computing, AI research, or other digital activities tomorrow. Conclusion The parallels between Bitcoin mining and Dutch Disease are significant: sudden, high-value activity that crowds out traditional industries through resource competition, price inflation, talent reallocation, and infrastructure specialization. Kazakhstan’s 2021–2022 experience demonstrates this pattern can unfold rapidly. Yet essential differences exist. Mining’s mobility, currency neutrality, profitability volatility, and repurposable infrastructure create policy opportunities unavailable to governments confronting traditional resource curses. The question isn’t whether mining causes economic distortion — in some contexts it clearly has — but whether stakeholders will act to channel this activity toward sustainable development. For the Bitcoin community, this means recognizing that long-term industry viability depends on avoiding the resource curse pattern. Regions devastated by boom-bust cycles will ultimately restrict or ban mining regardless of short-term benefits. Sustainable growth requires accepting pricing that reflects actual costs, respecting concentration limits, and contributing to infrastructure that serves broader economic purposes. For host regions, the challenge is capturing mining’s benefits without sacrificing economic diversity. History shows resource booms that seem profitable in the moment often weaken economies in the long run. The key is recognizing risks during the boom — when everything seems positive and there’s pressure to embrace the opportunity uncritically — rather than waiting until damage becomes undeniable. The next decade will determine whether Bitcoin mining becomes a cautionary tale of resource misallocation or a case study in integrating volatile, technology-intensive industries into developing economies without triggering historical pathologies. The outcome depends not on the technology itself, but on whether humans shaping investment and policy decisions learn from history’s repeated lessons about how sudden wealth can become an economic curse. References Canadian economy suffers from ‘Dutch disease’ | Correspondent Frank Kuin. https://frankkuin.com/en/2005/11/03/dutch-disease-canada/ Sovereign Wealth Funds — Angadh Nanjangud. https://angadh.com/sovereignwealthfunds Understanding Bitcoin Mining Through the Lens of Dutch Disease was originally published in Coinmonks on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story
Share
Medium2025/11/05 13:53