Coinbase’s CPO has defended stablecoins and pushed back on the banking sector’s fears of a potential collapse of bank deposits and community banks, arguing that the concerns are unfounded and could pose a risk to the emerging sector. Related Reading: Ondo Finance Brings Tokenized Stocks, ETFs To BNB Chain With New Expansion Coinbase Refutes Banks’ […]Coinbase’s CPO has defended stablecoins and pushed back on the banking sector’s fears of a potential collapse of bank deposits and community banks, arguing that the concerns are unfounded and could pose a risk to the emerging sector. Related Reading: Ondo Finance Brings Tokenized Stocks, ETFs To BNB Chain With New Expansion Coinbase Refutes Banks’ […]

Coinbase CPO Challenges Banks’ Stablecoins Concerns, Says Narrative ‘Ignores Reality’

2025/10/31 18:00

Coinbase’s CPO has defended stablecoins and pushed back on the banking sector’s fears of a potential collapse of bank deposits and community banks, arguing that the concerns are unfounded and could pose a risk to the emerging sector.

Coinbase Refutes Banks’ ‘Inconsistent’ Claims

As the stablecoin sector’s momentum grows, Coinbase CPO Faryar Shirzad has challenged the US banking industry’s concerns over potential risks associated with the emerging digital assets.

In an X post, Shirzad affirmed that the ongoing narrative that stablecoins will destroy bank lending “ignores reality” and misreads the moment, as “faster, cheaper, programmable transactions aren’t a threat—they’re overdue progress.”

A market note from the Coinbase Institute, cited by the CPO, stated that these arguments “echo familiar worries from earlier innovations like money market funds. Yet they fail to account for how and where stablecoins are actually used, and what they contribute to financial modernization.”

As reported by Bitcoinist, the banking sector has criticized the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act for potential loopholes that could pose risks to the financial system.

The landmark crypto framework, which was signed into law in July, prohibits interest payments on the holding or use of payment-purpose stablecoins. However, the prohibition only tackles issuers and could be “easily circumvented” by exchanges or affiliates providing rewards.

In August, multiple banking associations across the US sent a joint letter to the Senate Banking Committee urging Congress to amend the law. The letter argued that interest payments distort market dynamics and could affect credit creation, and suggested extending the prohibition on interest payments to include digital asset exchanges, brokers, dealers, and related entities.

Since then, multiple industry players, including Shirzad, have rejected these concerns, stating that the banking sector’s proposals could threaten to create an uncompetitive environment for stablecoins.

Stablecoins Won’t Drain US Banks

Coinbase Institute outlined multiple reasons why stablecoins won’t drain deposits from US banks and instead will strengthen the global role of the US dollar, introduce long-overdue competition in the payments sector, and support new, more efficient channels for credit formation.

The market note argued that stablecoin demand is global, with most current use coming from abroad and on-chain markets. They cited a recent Atlantic Council report showing that over 80 percent of transaction volume comes from international users seeking dollar exposure.

Meanwhile, around two-thirds of stablecoin transfers occur within decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms or blockchain-based payment rails. Coinbase added that USD-pegged digital assets expand dollar access worldwide and reinforce its dominance.

Additionally, Coinbase highlighted that banks have excess liquidity and have put out trillions of dollars of deposits in reserves and treasuries, suggesting that the sector has enough credit slack to compete with stablecoins for a more efficient financial system. Therefore, it would be “inconsistent to claim that stablecoin growth poses a systemic threat.”

The market note also emphasized that community banks are largely unaffected by the sector’s growth, arguing that stablecoin users and community bank customers rarely overlap.

Lastly, Coinbase asserted that “Credit is evolving, not shrinking. Lending is shifting to private credit, fintech, and DeFi channels that don’t depend on deposits. Liquidity moves—it doesn’t vanish,” concluding that “treating this development as a threat risks misunderstanding the transformative direction of financial innovation and constraining an emerging advantage for the United States.”

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PANews2025/11/04 14:00