Assessing the first half of the Marcos Jr. administration: Agriculture

(Part 2)

Let us start with agriculture. At the very outset, let me state that it is in this sector where we can give a relatively high rating to the performance of the current administration. The required 3-4% annual growth in this sector was actually achieved in an otherwise disastrous 2025 when GDP grew the slowest in 15 years (excluding the abnormal period of the COVID-19 pandemic).

This good performance can be attributed to more enlightened policy and more efficient management by the government of this very important sector. It must be pointed out that the Marcos Jr. administration started in mid-2022 when agriculture was under great strain, shaped by lingering post-pandemic disruptions that led to elevated input costs, not to mention the increasingly volatile weather conditions.

As regards the growth in agriculture during the opening quarters of the past three administrations, that of the Marcos Jr. administration suffered in comparison with the previous two, with year-on-year growth slipping to around -0.3% in late 2022 and sinking even further through mid-2023 to roughly -2.3% to -2.7%. These declines coincided with episodes of flooding and typhoon damage in key producing regions, which disrupted planting and harvesting cycles, particularly for rice and other staples (although the term of President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino suffered even worse natural calamities).

Nonetheless, what is commendable is how the sector did not remain in decline. By late 2023, contractions had moderated and by early 2024, growth had returned to positive territory (around 2.2%). This recovery strengthened further in 2024-2025, culminating in a sharp rebound at nearly 7% in the second quarter of 2025, contributing to a respectable 2.6% of agricultural growth for the entire year of 2025, the highest in eight years (which included most of the term of the Rodrigo Duterte administration).

The positive pattern points not to the disappearance of climate stress, but to an improving capacity to absorb shocks and to recover, indicating emerging resilience that can be reinforced through sustained investment in irrigation (a sector led by a very competent head of the National Irrigation Administration in the person of Director Ed Guillen), logistics, and climate adaptation.

In contrast, the Duterte administration followed a different trajectory. The early quarters were marked by initial weaknesses, including a pronounced contraction of agricultural production at the start of the period (a decrease of around -4%). Thanks to President Duterte’s pioneering Build, Build, Build program (his greatest economic accomplishment), agricultural growth strengthened during the middle years of his term, with several quarters exceeding 5-6%, with improved logistics, helped by some favorable production cycles. Over time, however, growth moderated and flattened, settling largely at the 1-3% range, with occasional near-zero readings, as agriculture increasingly encountered harsh climate conditions and animal diseases.

As regards the Aquino administration, the early years had robust growth of as high as 5-6% during several quarters. Unfortunately, over time, growth decelerated steadily, easing toward low single-digit and near-zero rates. This trajectory underscores the limits of rebound-led growth when deeper productivity and resilience investments have not been fully embedded.

Philippine agriculture has become increasingly exposed to climate volatility. Earlier administrations benefited from more benign conditions that supported stronger rebounds. The recovery of agriculture towards the end of the first half of the Marcos Jr. administration has occurred amid more frequent and intense climate shocks. This lends the rebound particular significance and underscores a forward-looking policy opportunity to embed climate resilience, disaster preparedness, and adaptive technologies into the agricultural growth strategy so that future expansions will be sustainable.

For this reason, the failure in good governance that resulted in the flood control corruption scandal is doubly tragic because of its negative influence on the efforts to reduce the impact of natural disasters on agricultural production.

(To be continued.)

Bernardo M. Villegas has a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard, is professor emeritus at the University of Asia and the Pacific, and a visiting professor at the IESE Business School in Barcelona, Spain. He was a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

bernardo.villegas@uap.asia